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Alternative Entities and Fiduciary Duty Waivers
in Delaware
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1900s, Delaware has been the preeminent state
for businesses to incorporate, 1 with more than half of the current
Fortune 500 companies incorporated there. 2 With the emergence of
limited liability partnerships and limited liability companies,
Delaware has also become the primary formation state for alternative
entities. The attractiveness of Delaware to corporations and
alternative entities is due both to the favorable legislation and to the
competent judiciary found in the state. This is especially true in
regards to alternative entities, where the legislature has given large
deference to the freedom of contract between the members or
partners of these entities. Additionally, the court of chancery’s
distinct equity jurisdiction has allowed it to specialize in corporate
law, giving businesses the reassurance that the Delaware judiciary not
only fully understands complex corporate law issues, but also has
extensive experience in the practical application of corporate law. 3
One area of debate in Delaware law surrounds the doctrine of
fiduciary duties in the context of alternative entities. In recent years,
it has been firmly established that fiduciary duties in alternative
entity agreements may be modified, and even waived, as long as
done so expressly. This ability to modify and waive fiduciary duties in
the alternative entity context has not only brought with it all the
benefits of freedom of contract, allowing the parties to define exactly
what standards are applicable in specific situations, but has also
inherited the downsides of contract law, such as the challenges courts
face when interpreting ambiguous agreements. As Delaware courts
1. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF
CORPORATIONS,
WHY
CORPORATIONS
CHOOSE
DELAWARE
1
(2007),
http://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf.
2. Id.
3. All five of the Chancellors on the court have spent portions of their legal practice at
firms in Delaware, with a number of them specializing in complex corporate and commercial
matters. See Judicial Officers of the Court of Chancery, DELAWARE STATE COURTS,
http://courts.delaware.gov/Chancery/judges.stm (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
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have been tasked with interpreting these alternative entity
agreements, various outcomes have occurred. The result has been
unpredictability and lack of met expectations regarding when and
what fiduciary duties will apply. This Comment proposes a solution
that will increase predictability for the contracting parties while also
allowing fiduciary duties to play their traditional role of filling gaps
in incomplete contracts.
This Comment begins in Part I by laying out the history and
nature of the two common alternative entities—limited liability
partnerships and limited liability companies. The nature and history
of fiduciary duties are then discussed in Part II, with a focus on their
development in the alternative entity context in Delaware. Parts III
and IV cover the issues revolving around their waiver, namely
increased costs to the entity and unpredictability in judicial decisions,
as well as why current contractual interpretative methods in this
context are futile. Finally, in Part V, this Comment proposes a
possible solution—that Delaware courts should narrowly and strictly
construe the “express” requirement, first determining if a fiduciary
duty waiver or modifying provision is clear and express, and applying
default fiduciary duties when there is material ambiguity in the
contractual provision modifying or waiving the fiduciary duty. This
solution will be supported by looking at the important nature of
fiduciary duties in fiduciary relationships and by showing that the
burden should be placed on the fiduciary, in his role as a fiduciary, to
explicitly and clearly waive his duties so that all parties are allowed
predictability in ordering their business affairs.
I. ALTERNATIVE ENTITIES IN DELAWARE
Two primary types of alternative entities to the traditional
American business entity of the corporation exist in Delaware—the
limited liability company (LLC) and the limited liability partnership
(LLP). In Delaware, the formation of alternative entities has
outpaced the formation of corporations. 4 In 2011, “non-corporate
business associations as a percentage of new businesses formed w[as]
75%.” 5 Both entities being relatively new, a primary feature of these
4. Brent J. Horton, The Going-Private Freeze-Out: A Unique Danger for Investors in
Delaware Non-Corporate Business Associations, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 53, 94 (2013).
5. Id.
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alternative business entities is the large allowance for contractual
freedom. As these alternative entities have become increasingly more
popular in recent years, there has been an increased focus on the
legal issues surrounding their establishment, organization, and
internal conflicts.
A. Limited Liability Companies
Limited liability companies were an innovation of the corporate
world to bridge the gap between the tax benefits of partnerships and
the limited liability of corporations. LLCs benefit from the passthrough tax treatment of partnerships while maintaining the benefit
of the corporation structure where each member and manager enjoys
limited liability. 6 Originally, the LLC revolution began in Wyoming,
with early LLCs having partnership characteristics in regards to
entity management, continuity of life, and transferability of
ownership. 7 As IRS classifications began to loosen, however,
increased flexibility in LLC form began to emerge, birthing one of
the current primary characteristics of LLCs—freedom of contract. 8
The relationship between the members and managers is
governed by an operating agreement. In Delaware, the operating
agreement is dictated by the Delaware LLC act, which grants LLC
founders great discretion in both the substantive and procedural
aspects of their operating agreements. 9 Because of these and other
benefits, LLCs have gained great support in Delaware and are often
the entity of choice. In 2009, there were 70,274 LLCs registered in
Delaware compared to just 24,955 corporations. 10 That number
increased in 2011 to 93,219 LLCs, with the number of corporations
in contrast only increasing to 31,472. 11

6. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Two Decades of “Alternative Entities”: From Tax
Rationalization Through Alphabet Soup to Contract as Deity, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
445, 447–48 (2008).
7. Id. at 451.
8. Id. at 453–55, 462.
9. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18 (2013).
10. DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., 2011 Annual Report 1 (2011), http://corp.delaware.gov/
2011CorpAR.pdf.
11. Id.
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B. Limited Liability Partnerships
As LLCs were beginning to gain steam across the country,
limited liability partnerships began to develop. 12 Originating in
Texas, LLPs have gained widespread acceptance across the country
and are currently the primary organizational structure of professional
firms. 13 In its base form, a partnership is essentially just an agreement
or contract between parties, though one that is fiduciary in nature. A
distinguishing characteristic of the original form of general
partnerships is the unlimited liability each partner carries to third
parties as well as the fiduciary duty each partner owes to the others. 14
The innovation of LLPs came about as a way to reduce member
partners’ unlimited liability to third parties. In an LLP the partners
are not personally liable, though they still hold a duty to each
other. 15 Since its creation, the LLP structure has gained large support
in the business world and in Delaware specifically. In 2009, there
were 5,488 LP/LPPs in Delaware, growing to 7,287 by 2011. 16
C. Contractual Freedom
Because both LLPs and LLCs are largely dependent on their
operating agreements and such operating agreements are permitted
great leeway in their structure and content under the Delaware LP
and LLC acts, contractual freedom has played a large role for LLPs
and LLCs. In reference to the Limited Liability Company Act, the
Delaware legislature has stated, “[i]t is the policy of [the Limited
Liability Company Act] to give the maximum effect to the principle
of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability
company agreements.” 17 The Limited Partnership chapter of the
Code states the same policy. 18 Some have even characterized the LLC
as “purely a creature of contract,” especially in the context of

12. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 142 (2009).
13. Id.
14. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15 (2013).
15. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17 (2013).
16. DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., supra note 10, at 1.
17. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2013).
18. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(b) (2013) (“It is the policy of this chapter to
give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of
partnership agreements.”).
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fiduciary duty issues. 19 Chancellors of the Delaware Court of
Chancery claim that in their reading of large numbers of operating
and partnership agreements, “[a] lack of standardization prevails in
the alternative entity arena,” with drafters taking full advantage of
the freedom to contract varying characteristic of alternative entities. 20
Although this freedom of contract in the alternative entity arena
provides a number of benefits for those involved, it can also lead to
confusion in post hoc interpretation of certain provisions. This
confusion can be seen in courts’ interpretations of clauses that intend
to contract around default fiduciary duties.
II. FIDUCIARY DUTIES
“A fiduciary relationship is a situation where one person reposes
special trust in and reliance on the judgment of another or where a
special duty exists on the part of one person to protect the interests
of another.” 21 Fiduciary duties were originally an invention of
common law and focus on providing equitable relief. Fiduciary
duties impose certain duties on one party when that party acts as an
agent for the interests of another. 22 Such principle-agent relationships
must also carry a level of discretionary power vested in the agent for
a fiduciary relationship to arise. Such duties arise because of the
control one party has over the assets or interests of the other. 23
Because there are costs associated with specifying and monitoring
the fiduciaries’ functions, “[f]iduciary duties are imposed when
public policy encourages specialization in particular services, such as
money management or lawyering, and when . . . [those] costs . . .
threaten to undermine the utility of the relationship to entrustors.” 24

19. Kleinberger, supra note 7, at 464.
20. Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual
Freedom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (Mark J. Loewenstein & Robert W. Hillman eds., 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2481039.
21. Metro Ambulance, Inc. v. E. Med. Billing, Inc., No. C.A. 13929, 1995 WL
409015, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 5, 1995) (quoting Cheese Shop Int’l, Inc. v. Steele, 303 A.2d
689, 690 (Del. Ch. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, 311 A.2d 870 (Del. 1973)).
22. 2 TAMAR FRANKEL, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW 127–28 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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Thus, the ultimate goal of the fiduciary doctrine is to provide
incentives for fiduciary relationships while lowering the risks and
costs associated with such relationships. 25 As defined by the
Restatement of Agency, “[a]n agent has a fiduciary duty to act
loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the
agency relationship.” 26 In fact, some even hold that fiduciary
relationships are designed to satisfy solely the needs of the entrustor
and not the fiduciary. 27 Both parties to a fiduciary relationship,
however, must gain some benefit from the relationship. Thus, it is
understandable that the parties would attempt to contract for a
mutually beneficial relationship that satisfies the interests of both the
fiduciary and the entrustor.
Fiduciary relationships expose an entrustor to two types of
wrongdoing—misappropriation and neglect of the asset’s
management. 28 Because of these risks associated with the fiduciary
relationship, two types of fiduciary duties have arisen: the duty of
loyalty, which governs misappropriation, and the duty of care, which
governs negligent mismanagement. 29 The Delaware Revised
Uniform Partnership Act (hereinafter DRULPA) describes the
elements of the duty of loyalty as: accounting to the partnership and
holding as trustee any profits, benefits, or partnership opportunities
that arise from the partnership; refraining from dealing with the
partnership on behalf of a party that has an adverse interest; and
refraining from competing with the partnership. 30 The duty of care is
defined by the Act as being “limited to refraining from engaging in
grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a
knowing violation of law.” 31 Simply put, the duty of loyalty concerns
honesty and the importance of avoiding self-dealing. The duty of
care, as its name suggests, requires a fiduciary to exercise care over
what he has been entrusted with, to the point of avoiding gross
negligence.
25. Id.
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
27. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 797–802 (1983).
28. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1991).
29. Id.
30. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-404(b) (2013).
31. Id. § 15-404(c).
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Fiduciary duties play a large role in business relationships where
one party exercises control over the property of another, such as
directors of corporations, managing partners in partnerships, and
managers of limited liability companies. 32 Fiduciary duties create an
incentive for investors to place their trust in another party, knowing
that the fiduciary is constrained by the duties legally imposed on
him. 33 Although it could be argued that similar results could be
accomplished through oversight or contractual bargaining, fiduciary
duties accomplish the goals without the immense expense and
difficulty of those other options. The expense of oversight would
often exceed, or at the very least minimalize, the entrustor’s benefits
from the relationship. 34 Similarly, the cost of contractual creation and
negotiation can be quite high, especially when attempting to
contract for every possible scenario. 35 Additionally, a welldocumented history of contract litigation shows that no matter the
ex-ante effort in structuring a contract there are always situations left
uncovered by the agreement. 36 Fiduciary duties “emerged in large
measure to address the situations involving the exercise of authority
by one person over another’s property that could not be effectively
addressed by contracting.” 37 It is perhaps for this very reason that
fiduciary duties are mandatory in the corporate context. Although
corporations are authorized under the Delaware Code to adopt
exculpatory provisions relieving directors from monetary liability for
duty of care breaches, 38 equitable remedies must remain.
Additionally, exculpatory provisions can never apply to the duty of

32. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 850 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Metro Ambulance, Inc. v. E. Med. Billing, Inc., No. C.A.
13929, 1995 WL 409015, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 5, 1995)) (“Under Delaware law, ‘[a] fiduciary
relationship is a situation where one person reposes special trust in and reliance on the
judgment of another or where a special duty exists on the part of one person to protect the
interests of another.’ Corporate directors, general partners and trustees are analogous examples
of those who Delaware law has determined owe a ‘special duty.’”).
33. FRANKEL, supra note 22.
34. Id.
35. George M. Cohen, Interpretation and Implied Terms in Contract Law, in
CONTRACT LAW AND ECONOMICS 125, 133 (Gerrit De Geest ed., 2d ed. 2011).
36. Id.
37. Strine & Laster, supra note 20, at 5.
38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).
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loyalty. 39 These restrictions, however, do not apply in the alternative
entity context.
A. Fiduciary Duties in the Alternative Entity Context
The Delaware Legislature has determined that both the duty of
loyalty and the duty of care may be expanded, restricted, and even
eliminated in alternative entities through either the partnership or
operating agreements. 40 Often, the interests of contractual freedom
are forwarded as the primary reason behind this broad allowance in
alternative entities. 41 Initially, this contractual freedom did not
include the complete elimination of fiduciary duties. In fact, in 2002,
the Delaware Supreme Court doubted the permissibility of
eliminating fiduciary duties entirely under DRULPA and emphasized
that “scrupulous adherence to fiduciary duties is normally expected”
under Delaware jurisprudence. 42 Although in 2004 the Delaware
Legislature amended the Delaware LP and LLC acts to explicitly
allow the elimination of fiduciary duties through alternative entity
operating agreements, this negative view of the court towards the
permissibility of eliminating fiduciary duties shows the important
role that these duties have played in the business entity context.
Because of this important role, the chancery court held in
Auriga Capital v. Gatz Properties (Auriga I) that fiduciary duties are
default rules for LLCs, unless explicitly waived. 43 The court stated
that “where the core default fiduciary duties have not been
supplanted by contract, they exist.” 44 The chancery court in Auriga I

39. Id.
40. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2010) (“To the extent that, at law or in
equity, a partner or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership
or to another partner or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a
partnership agreement, the partner’s or other person’s duties may be expanded or restricted or
eliminated by provisions in the partnership agreement; provided that the partnership
agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.”).
41. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 171101(b) (2010) (“It is the policy of this chapter to give maximum effect to the principle of
freedom of contract.”).
42. Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 167
(Del. 2002).
43. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 852 (Del. Ch. 2012).
44. Id.
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stated two important reasons for the default overlay of fiduciary
duties in the LLC context. First, it found that the fiduciary duty
defaults allow predictability to measure whether a fiduciary has met
her obligations. 45 Second, default fiduciary duties instill confidence
in investors investing in Delaware LLCs. 46 Although the Supreme
Court of Delaware criticized the chancery court for addressing an
issue that was not raised by the parties, it upheld the decision on
contractual grounds in Auriga II. 47 However, the view of default
fiduciary duties under Auriga I was followed by the chancery court
again in Feeley v. NHAOCG, though this time the issue was
addressed by the parties. 48 Additionally, in 2013 the Delaware
legislature amended the Delaware Code to make it clear that default
fiduciary duties do apply to LLCs when they have not been expressly
contracted away. 49
The chancery court’s reasoning in Auriga I is instructive of the
court’s views regarding fiduciary duties. Although often regarded as
creatures of contract, the court was unwilling to find that the
fiduciary duties did not apply to LLCs unless explicitly contracted
away. 50 In fact, the court found that they were so fundamental that
they were default rules. 51 It is important to note that the reasons for
the importance of fiduciary duties articulated by the court in Auriga
I are still relevant. The court’s views that defaults allow predictability
to measure whether a fiduciary has met her obligations has been
shown to be an important insight, as the courts’ decisions since have
shown a lack of predictability in attempting to interpret fiduciary
duty modification provisions.
This great flexibility in contracting the boundaries of when
fiduciary duties apply has been extensively utilized by alternative
entities in Delaware. In a study of 85 publicly traded alternative
entities, “75 (or 88%) either totally waive the fiduciary duties of
managers or eliminate liability rising from the breach of fiduciary

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 853.
Id. at 854.
See Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1214 (Del. 2012).
Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 659–63 (Del. Ch. 2012).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2013).
Auriga Capital Corp., 40 A.3d at 852.
Id.
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duties.” 52 Additionally, looking exclusively at publicly traded
alternative entities, “47.06% of limited liability companies and
94.20% of limited partnerships (cumulatively 84.88%) have operating
agreements with special approval provisions, creating a strong
presumption that a transaction complies with fiduciary
requirements.” 53 Beyond this, another “29.41% of limited liability
companies and 57.97% of limited partnerships (cumulatively 52.32%)
have
operating
agreements
that
eliminate
fiduciary
duties altogether.” 54
Although these figures solely represent publicly traded Delaware
alternative entities, they give an insight into the popularity of such
fiduciary duty waiving provisions by the drafters of alternative
entity agreements.
Despite there being no standardized language for waiving of
fiduciary duties, there has developed a somewhat commonly used
pattern. The following is a provision that roughly illustrates the
pattern the court of chancery has most often seen in LLP
waiver provisions:
Except as expressly set forth in this Agreement, neither the General
Partner nor any other Indemnitee shall have any duties or liabilities,
including fiduciary duties, to the Partnership or any Limited
Partner or Assignee and the provisions of this Agreement, to the
extent that they restrict, eliminate or otherwise modify the duties
and liabilities, including fiduciary duties, of the General Partner or
any other Indemnitee otherwise existing at law or in equity, are
agreed by the Partners to replace such other duties and liabilities of
the General Partner or such other Indemnitee. 55

The provision seeks to replace any traditional duties that would be
owed to investors with only those that are contractually specified.
The term “Indemnitee” is meant to cover all potential defendants in
addition to the General Partner. However, as pointed out by
Chancellors Strine and Laster, “[t]here are agreements . . . that omit
particular parties, leaving them exposed to traditional fiduciary duty

52. Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law:
Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 558 (2012).
53. Horton, supra note 4, at 94 (footnotes omitted).
54. Id. (footnotes omitted).
55. Strine & Laster, supra note 20, at 15.
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claims.” 56 It is suspected that “these omissions are examples of the
human errors that inevitably creep in during any lengthy drafting
assignment.” 57 Additionally, there are other agreements that, rather
than explicitly eliminate fiduciary duties, instead depend on detailed
contractual provisions to replace the traditional fiduciary duties. 58
The popularity of waiver provisions demonstrates that founders
of alternative entities believe there are a number of advantages to
their adoption. However, fiduciary duty waiver provisions have also
resulted in complications during the post hoc litigation stage.
III. SUPPORT FOR LIMITING FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN
ALTERNATIVE ENTITIES
There are a number of reasons why both principals and agents
may wish to limit fiduciary duties within alternative entity
agreements. First, there is a cost the principal must pay for fiduciary
duties to be applied. Ribstein describes this cost through an example:
[I]f the fiduciary-to-be believes that there is a 50% chance of
having to forgo a deal worth $100,000, this represents a $50,000
opportunity cost (ignoring the time value of money) of becoming a
fiduciary. The fiduciary-to-be similarly would take into account the
need to devote time unselfishly to the business. Before making the
leap to fiduciary status, the fiduciary-to-be would want to be
assured of being compensated for these sacrifices. The beneficiary,
in turn, would be willing to compensate the fiduciary for forgoing
self-advantage only if this would produce an adequate payoff. The
deal the parties are likely to reach will depend on the costs and
benefits of fiduciary duties . . . . 59

In other words, the fiduciary would need to be rewarded sufficiently
to compensate for the lost benefits he would have gained by acting
in an opportunistic fashion. Consequently, the entrustor would need
to gain a benefit from the enforcement of the fiduciary duties that
would outweigh the expense of enforcing them on the fiduciary. By
waiving certain aspects of fiduciary duties, such as allowing self-

56. Id. at 16 n.20.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 537, 543 (1997) (footnote omitted).

1357

DESPRES.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/21/2016 5:47 PM

2015

dealing in certain scenarios, the entrustor is not required to
economically compensate the fiduciary for his lost benefits, thus
potentially decreasing the cost of the relationship.
A second potential benefit of waiving or limiting fiduciary duty
requirements is that it can reduce impediments to the fiduciary’s
exercise of discretion. “Fiduciary duties arise in relationships in
which it is in the beneficiary’s interest to delegate open-ended
decision-making power to the fiduciary. Yet fiduciary duties can
undermine the main purpose of delegating power to the fiduciary by
impeding the fiduciary’s exercise of discretion.” 60 This can be
particularly troubling for investors who have invested in the
alternative entity as part of a diversified portfolio. Such members
would prefer greater risks be taken by the entity, but by placing the
risk on a single manager, it may force the fiduciary to act more
cautiously than would be preferred in a diversified portfolio. 61
Finally, there may be an increased cost in enforcing fiduciary
duties. 62 Assuming for the moment that the presence of fiduciary
duties would not constrain all opportunistic behavior, it would then
fall on the principal members of the entity to enforce those duties
through litigation. If fiduciary duties are clearly and explicitly
waived, this cost could be avoided. However, as will be discussed
below, waivers are often not done in a clear enough manner to avoid
future litigation over what and when fiduciary duties actually apply,
and thus litigation often occurs regardless. Similarly, this benefit of
decreased litigation costs would only occur if all fiduciary duties are
waived. If all fiduciary duties are waived, the only potential litigation
would revolve around simply whether the default duties apply or not,
rather than their exact contractually established boundaries. A
common practice, however, is the modifying or piecemeal adoption
of fiduciary duties in conjunction with a waiver, rather than a
complete waiver alone. As a result, increased litigation, rather than
less, is often the consequence.
It is clear, therefore, that there are valid reasons why both the
principal and the agent may wish to waive fiduciary duties in an
alternative entity. However, as will be discussed in Part IV, there are

60.
61.
62.
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complications that arise when alternative entity agreements attempt
to do more than simply waive the fiduciary duties, but rather attempt
to apply portions of them in some circumstances while waiving them
in others. This is further complicated when it is unclear to whom
such provisions apply.
IV. ISSUES CAUSED BY WAIVING FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Although the method of completely waiving fiduciary duties uses
somewhat standard language, complications arise when the parties
attempt to add back in specific aspects of fiduciary duties in the
agreement after having explicitly eliminated the applicability of
fiduciary duties generally or when the waiver of fiduciary duties is
not done in a clear and express way. The courts’ interpretations of
the LLC and LLP acts have firmly established the rule that fiduciary
duty waivers and modifying provisions must be express. 63 The
problem, however, is how narrowly and strictly the court holds the
drafting parties to this “express” requirement. The question must be
asked: if the waiving and modifying of fiduciary duties is convoluted
and ambiguous, but may still be parsed out of the document, is it
actually express? Or, should the express standard require clear and
exact wording before it will be honored by the courts?
The resulting problems caused by ambiguous and convoluted
fiduciary duty provisions can be broken down into two broad
categories—increased
costs
(both
ex-ante
and
ex-post)
and unpredictability.
A. Increased Costs
The waiving of fiduciary duties and then the attempted adding
back in of specific fiduciary aspects could arguably be increasing,
rather than protecting against, greater financial expense to alternative
entities. This increased expense may occur in two ways: ex-ante
structuring of the partnership or operating agreement and ex-post
litigation over fiduciary duty issues.
63. See In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, C.A. No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 4273122, at *10
(Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010); Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, 2009
WL 1124451, at *8–11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009); see also Kelly v. Blum, 2010 WL 629850, at
*11–12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 1010) (noting that contractual alterations of traditional fiduciary
duties must be explicit).
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First, in regards to ex-ante structuring, as discussed previously, it
is quite impossible to contract for every potential occurrence. 64 For
this very reason, fiduciary duties have remained mandatory in the
corporate context. 65 Fiduciary duties fulfill the role of “an equitable
gap-filler,” going beyond the narrow restrictions of the good faith
requirement. 66 When a party attempts to add back in fiduciary duties
for potential future situations, the drafter must anticipate not only
what situations may occur, but also the parties that will be involved.
This becomes even more difficult when considering the evergrowing complexity of the business world. With each new year, more
complex and innovative deals, transactions, and methods are devised
in corporate practice. Predicting what may be a standard even five
years from now has become precarious at best. Such detailed
contracting for every eventuality is impractical. Given the complexity
and time involved, including legal fees and time spent in negotiating,
contracting can be prohibitively expensive. 67
Second, in regards to ex-post litigation, there is the potential for
an increased expense from litigating ambiguous provisions that
modify fiduciary duties. Because the language often contains some
ambiguity in regards to the precise facts of the situation and the
parties covered, petitioners are usually able to draft a complaint that
will at least get past dismissal. 68 Some have recognized a “surfacelevel standardization” in these provisions, but quickly point out that
“this superficial standardization is overwhelmed by diversity in
implementation . . . creat[ing] fertile opportunities for future
litigation.” 69 Considering that a great deal of provisions that evoke
some form of fiduciary duty utilize the “gross negligence” language,
it is usually possible for petitioners to draft a complaint that alleges
such gross negligence. 70

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
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B. Unpredictability in Judicial Decisions
More troublesome than the financial cost is the possibility of
unmet expectations and unpredictability that comes with this
flexibility in contracting around fiduciary duties. Because of the
potential ambiguity in these provisions when diversely implemented,
predicting the results of the court in each situation is difficult to say
the least. This inability of knowing how the court will rule in specific
factual situations leaves both the fiduciary and the petitioners with a
lack of predictability regarding what fiduciary duties will apply.
Fiduciaries are unclear what their specific duties are under each
situation, and the petitioners cannot be certain when and how they
are protected by the default fiduciary duties. Given that freedom of
contract’s main purpose is to allow parties to determine how certain
situations will be dealt with, it is ironic that freedom of contract in
this context creates more unpredictability.
This problem is best highlighted by the lead in paragraph of the
opinion in Kahn v. Portnoy:
Limited liability companies are primarily creatures of contract, and
the parties have broad discretion to design the company as they see
fit in an LLC agreement. With this discretion, however, comes the
risk—for both the parties and this Court—that the resulting LLC
agreement will be incomplete, unclear, or even incoherent.
In this case, plaintiff alleges that the director defendants breached
their fiduciary duties to the company . . . . As the company in this
case is an LLC, the fiduciary duties of the directors are defined in
the LLC agreement. This agreement, however, explicitly imports
and modifies the familiar and well defined fiduciary duties from
Delaware corporate law. The result is a company whose directors
are governed by a modified version of the fiduciary duties of
directors of Delaware corporations. Unfortunately, the agreement
in this case fails to clearly articulate the contours of these
contractual fiduciary duties. The result is an LLC agreement that
provides an ambiguous definition of fiduciary duties and is open to
more than one reasonable interpretation. 71

71. Kahn v. Portnoy, 2008 WL 5197164, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2008)
(emphasis added).
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The result of this ambiguity was the court not being able to hold
that one position was the only permissible interpretation, and thus
the court was unable to award a motion to dismiss, leading to
further litigation. 72 This problem is compounded by the fact that
because of the unique nature of fiduciary duties current contract
interpretation methods, such as contextualism and textualism, are
insufficient to resolve potential ambiguities.
1. Contextualism and textualism are insufficient for resolving
the ambiguity
Contract interpretation is one of the least settled and most
contentious areas of current contract doctrine. 73 Two primary polar
positions of contractual interpretation, namely contextualism and
textualism, have developed to compete for the center stage in
contract doctrine. However, both are insufficient for resolving the
ambiguity in fiduciary duty modifying waivers. Both interpretation
methods developed out of a need to align contradictory
interpretations of contractual provisions. But, fiduciary duty waivers
do not boil down simply to another contractual provision, and thus
neither contextualism nor textualism can resolve their
common ambiguities.
The basic premise behind the two interpretation methods is
simple. Textualism proposes that contracts and agreements are
formed between sophisticated parties, who have carefully negotiated
and understood the terms of the agreement they have entered into.
Thus, when interpreting provisions of the agreement, the parties
would prefer that the court look at the carefully drafted language,
and nothing beyond. 74 In opposition to the textualism rationale,
contextualism recognizes that not all contracts or agreements are
entered into between sophisticated parties. Rather than carefully
negotiated wording, often provisions are simply copied from prior
precedents and offered to the other party as a take-it-or-leave-it
proposition. Contextualism, therefore, looks at all of the pre- and

72. Id.
73. Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract
Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 25 (2014).
74. Robert E. Scott, Text versus Context: The Failure of the Unitary Law of Contract
Interpretation, in THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF LAW 312, 314 (2013).
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post-contractual evidence in an attempt to determine what the
parties intended when they came to a “meeting of the minds.” 75
Each polar end of the interpretation spectrum carries with it its
own weaknesses. For textualism to truly reflect the intentions of the
parties, the idea that unsophisticated parties enter into agreements
must be ignored. On the other hand, contextualism depends on the
courts’ ability to always parse out the actual intent of the parties,
even though at least some parties would rather not turn over such
control to the courts, fearing a substantial risk that the courts will
erroneously infer the parties’ intent. 76
The weaknesses of contextualism and textualism are incompatible
with the world of alternative entity agreements, and fiduciary duty
modifying provisions. Contextualism by its very nature requires the
court to look beyond the language of the agreement in an attempt
to infer the parties’ intentions or, in other words, to determine what
they would have drafted if they were now in the judge’s position.
However, if there is one thing that is consistent throughout recent
Delaware decisions on fiduciary duty waivers, it is that the waiver
must be express. 77 Thus, when there is an actual ambiguity regarding
whether a fiduciary duty applies, the rule laid out by the court itself
prohibits the court from looking at outside evidence and considering
the context of the agreement when determining the parties’ intent.
Unfortunately, the strength of contextualism is the weakness of
textualism. Where contextualism allows the court to try and
determine the intents of the parties beyond the simple language of
the agreement, textualism is bound to the four corners of the
document. When fiduciary duty waivers are clear, this does not pose
a problem. The difficulty, however, arises when such provisions are
convoluted or contradictory. Similarly, textualism’s weaknesses
become even more prevalent in the context of fiduciary duty
modifying provisions. A large portion of LLC agreements are not
negotiated between sophisticated parties, but are drafted by one
party and offered to investors or other parties as is. Such agreements
often come in a take-it-or-leave-it package, with fiduciary duty
waivers being neither negotiated nor often fully understood.

75.
76.
77.

Id. at 314.
Id. at 315.
See cases cited supra note 62.
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Although it is established that both parties have a good faith duty of
diligence to understand the agreements they enter into, as will be
shown, often the complete waiving of fiduciary duties and then the
piecemeal addition of certain duties is convoluted, confusing, and
contradictory on its face. Thus, a purely textualistic interpretation of
these agreements does not reflect the intent of the parties and does
harm to one or both parties.
An example of the court looking at the plain language within the
four corners of the agreement can be seen in the court of chancery’s
holding in Continental Insurance Co. v. Rutledge & Co., where the
court held that in interpreting provisions to modify a general
partner’s duty of loyalty, traditional principles of contract
construction apply. 78 In so doing, the court attempted to “distill and
enforce the reasonable, shared expectations of the parties at the time
they contracted.” 79 In Continental Insurance the court expressed
that it was not necessary to look beyond the express contractual
language, holding that it was able to discern the expectations of the
parties from the clear language of the agreement, since it was not
overly ambiguous. The court held that the relevant provision did not
address situations of the general partner engaging in self-dealing
within the partnership. Thus, the court found that the default
fiduciary duty of loyalty applied. 80
Unfortunately, more difficulty is often seen in interpreting
fiduciary duty waiver provisions that are contradictory in nature. As
the court is confined to the four corners of the agreement, the
original intent of both parties cannot be sufficiently considered. In
Bay Center Apartments Owner LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, the
plaintiffs pled a breach of fiduciary duty. 81 Vice Chancellor Strine
began by acknowledging that under the Delaware LLC Act, there
was great flexibility in negotiating fiduciary duties, but that absent “a
contrary provision in the LLC agreement,” the traditional fiduciary
duties apply to the members of the LLC. 82 The defendants in the suit
claimed that all of the fiduciary duties had been waived, while the
78. Continental Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., 750 A.2d 1219, 1236 (Del. Ch. 2000).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1235–36.
81. Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, 2009 WL 1124451
(Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009).
82. Id. at *8.
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plaintiffs claimed that the traditional fiduciary duties had been
preserved. To support these views, the parties had cited to two
separate and, as the court acknowledged, “seemingly contradictory
provisions of the LLC Agreement.” 83 The provisions stated:
Section 6.1 Relationship of Members. Each Member agrees that, to
the fullest extent permitted by the Delaware Act and except as
otherwise expressly provided in this Agreement or any other
agreement to which the Member is a party: . . . (b) The Members
shall have the same duties and obligations to each other that members
of a limited liability company formed under the Delaware Act have to
each other.
Section 6.2 Liability of Members. . . . Except for any duties imposed
by this Agreement . . . each Member shall owe no duty of any kind
towards the Company or the other Members in performing its
duties and exercising its rights hereunder or otherwise. 84

As the court acknowledged, the agreement both stated that the
members of the LLC owed each other the default fiduciary duties,
but also none other than the kind imposed by the agreement itself. It
would thus seem that the agreement in the same breath imposed
traditional fiduciary duties and limited duties only to contractual
duties, which does not include those defined as fiduciary. To
overcome this apparent contradiction, the court utilized a textualist
approach, choosing a particular reading that would not render either
provision meaningless. 85 To do this, the court held that it was
possible for Section 6.1(b) to be read as “expressly impos[ing] the
default fiduciary duties,” thus allowing them to be imposed by the
Agreement and not be included in the duties waived by Section
6.2. 86 The court based this reading on the contractual interpretation
maxim that, “given ambiguity between potentially conflicting terms,
a contract should be read so as not to render any
term meaningless.” 87

83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting LLC Agreement §§ 6.1, 6.2 (emphasis added)).
85. Id
86. Id.
87. Id. at *9 (quoting Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d
715, 741 (Del. Ch. 2008)).
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Because of the contradictory language of the provisions, it is
difficult to determine if the drafters’ intent truly was what the court
determined it to be. If, perhaps, the drafters did structure the
agreement to have the exact meaning that the court held, it would
still seem quite reasonable at the outset for one of the parties to not
fully understand what fiduciary duties were owed by the fiduciary in
the agreement. This ambiguity obviously leaves both parties without
proper notification of their duties or the duties owed them.
Although the court briefly states that the importance of fiduciary
duties tipped the scales in favor of their finding, it would seem, given
the textualist approach to contractual interpretation the court
employed, that the opposite could also have just as easily occurred.
When agreements are convoluted, contradictory, and unclear, the
court’s attempt to apply traditional textualist contractual
interpretation leaves both parties with unpredictability and unmet
expectations. An example of this unpredictability is seen in the
interpretation in Gelfman v. Weeden Investors, L.P., where again the
court was required to determine what fiduciary duties applied in a
partnership agreement that was not at all clear on its face. 88 As
Chancellor Strine put it in the published opinion, “the drafters took
a more (shall we say) textured approach” to modifying the default
fiduciary duties. 89 Excerpts of the relevant portions of the
partnership agreement demonstrate just how confusing these waivers
can be:
6.10 Liability of the General Partner. (a) Neither the General
Partner nor . . . directors [or] officers . . . of the General Partner
shall be liable . . . for errors in judgment or for any acts or
omissions taken in good faith.
....
6.11 (a) Unless otherwise expressly provided herein, (i) whenever a
conflict of interest exists or arises between the General Partner or
any of its Affiliates, on the one hand, and the Partnership, any
Limited Partner or Any Assignee, on the other hand . . . the
General Partner shall resolve such conflict of interest, take such
action or provide such terms considering, in each case, the relative

88.
89.
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interests of each party to such conflict, agreement, transaction or
situation and the benefits and burdens relating to such interests,
any customary or accepted industry practices, and any applicable
generally accepted accounting practices or principles. In the
absence of bad faith by the General Partner, the resolution, action
or terms so made, taken or provided by the General Partner shall
not constitute a breach of this Agreement. . . . (b) Whenever in this
Agreement or the Operating Partnership Agreement the General
Partner is permitted or required to make a decision (i) in its “sole
discretion” or “discretion,” with “complete discretion” or under a
grant of similar authority or latitude, the General Partner shall be
entitled to consider only such interests and factors as it desires and
shall have no duty or obligation to give any consideration to any
interest of or factors affecting the Partnership, the Operating
Partnership, the Limited Partners or the Assignees. . . . Each
Limited Partner . . . hereby agrees that any standard of care or duty
imposed in this Agreement, . . . or under the Delaware Act or any
other applicable law, rule or regulation shall be modified, waived or
limited in each case as required to permit the General Partner to
act under this Agreement . . . and to make any decision pursuant to
the authority prescribed in this Section 6.11(b) so long as such
action or decision does not constitute gross negligence or willful or
wanton misconduct and is not reasonably believed by the General
Partner to be inconsistent with the overall purposes of
the Partnership. 90

In reference to this agreement’s provisions, the court stated that
it “ha[s] a head-spinning quality upon first reading.” 91 The court
went even as far as stating that provisions of the agreement were
“baffling in certain respects.” 92 The tone and wording of the court’s
opinion shows the difficulty the court faced in interpreting an
alternative entity agreement where a lack of information was present.
The court implicitly admits to being required to dig deep into the
language of the agreement, even turning a negatively worded
Proviso phrase positive to try and glean some plausible
interpretation. 93 Additionally, the court admits that its reading results

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 984–86 (quoting Partnership Agreement §§ 6.10, 6.11).
Id. at 986.
Id.
Id. at 986–87.
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in a “harsh” and “rather odd” interpretation. 94 It would seem, then,
that the court held strictly to a textualist contractual interpretation
method, implicitly acknowledging that at least one party’s
expectations may not have been met. With a lack of information, it
can never be certain that the court will come to the same conclusion
that both parties intended when the agreement was drafted, thus
potentially leaving at least one party’s expectations unfilled and with
a lack of predictability in its business affairs.
There have been times, however, where the court has strictly and
narrowly construed the rule that fiduciary duty waivers must be
explicit. In In re Atlas Energy Resources, LLC, the court was faced
with determining if the following provision applied to
controlling unitholders:
[W]henever a potential conflict of interest exists or arises between
any Affiliate of the Company, on the one hand, and the Company
or any Group Member, on the other, any resolution or course of
action by the Board of Directors in respect of such conflict of
interest shall be permitted and deemed approved by all Members,
and shall not constitute a breach of this Agreement . . . or of any
duty existing at law, in equity or otherwise, including any fiduciary
duty, if the resolution or course of action in respect of such conflict
of interest is (i) approved by Special Approval, (ii) approved by the
vote of holders of a majority of the Outstanding Common Units
(excluding Common Units held by interested parties), (iii) on
terms no less favorable to the Company than those being generally
available to or available from unrelated third parties or (iv) fair and
reasonable to the Company, taking into account the totality of the
relationships between the parties involved (including other
transaction that may be particularly favorable to the Company). 95

The court held that it was “especially wary of eliminating
[fiduciary] duties in the context of a publicly traded limited liability
company without sufficient evidence within the contractual language
of the parties’ intent to do so.” 96 Thus the court went on to explain
that the controlling unitholders’ fiduciary duties would not be
disclaimed unless expressly done so in the previous provision or
94. Id. at 986.
95. In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, C.A. No. 4589-VCN, 2010 WL 4273122, at *6–7
(Del. Ch. July 20, 2010).
96. Id. at *7.
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somewhere else in the agreement. 97 Although the provision waived
some fiduciary duties, the court strictly held to the rule requiring
clear and explicit waivers, and held that “[t]he contractual language
of [the provision] does not purport to resolve conflicts of interest
between [controlling] and . . . minority unitholders.” 98
Beyond the weaknesses of textualism and contextualism in the
context of fiduciary duty waivers, treating provisions dealing with
fiduciary duty waivers as standard contractual provisions is flawed in
itself. Neither of these contractual interpretation methods is
sufficient in the fiduciary duty modification context because,
although the waiving or modifying of fiduciary duties is done
through provisions in the partnership or LLC agreement, fiduciary
duties are not species of implied contract terms. By modifying the
boundaries of fiduciary duties, the parties are in a sense attempting
to mutate fiduciary duties into contractual terms, and thus the courts
face the temptation to approach such provisions as they would other
contractual provisions. The problem with treating fiduciary duties as
contractual terms, is that it
implies that judges should craft particular rules for the parties.
Often framed in terms of a hypothetical bargain, this approach
urges judges to choose the result the parties would have chosen
had they anticipated the situation at issue, but this sort of
reasoning is quite different from deciding simply whether the
fiduciary acted appropriately within the scope of her discretion. 99

Contract interpretation is based on the presumption “that the
parties will act in a mutually self-interested manner” with each party
being “responsible for securing their interests in dealings with the
other.” 100 In contrast to contractual interpretation, it is assumed in
fiduciary law “that the parties are interacting for the exclusive benefit
of one of them—the beneficiary.” 101 Thus, by the very nature of

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. D. Gordon Smith & Jordan C. Lee, Fiduciary Discretion, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 609,
622 (2014).
100. Id. at 622 n.65 (quoting Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, 58 MCGILL
L.J. 969, 982 (2013)).
101. Id.
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fiduciary duties, such provisions demand a different interpretive
approach than other contractual provisions.
Because of the nature of fiduciary duties, the established
requirements for waiving fiduciary duties, and the inherent
weaknesses in both textualism and contextualism, the current
framework utilized by the courts in determining which fiduciary
duties apply leaves parties a lack of predictability in court decisions
and the possibility of unmet expectations and misconstrued intent.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Courts should narrowly construe the current rule that fiduciary
duty waivers must be expressly contracted away, requiring that only
clear and unambiguous waiving or modifying of fiduciary duties will
be upheld. As has been shown, looking at extrinsic evidence or the
context of the agreement is inappropriate when precedent requires
that a waiver be express, and textualism does not have the ability to
properly protect the intentions of both parties when it treats
fiduciary duty provisions the same as any other contractual provision.
Indeed, as mentioned above, fiduciary duty provisions are more than
a contractual provision and applying the same contractual
interpretation methodologies does harm to the fiduciary duty
doctrine. For these reasons, unless a provision that seeks to limit
fiduciary duties is clear and explicit, the court should find that the
default duties apply. The relative analysis of the court would thus be
to determine first if the duties have been modified expressly in a clear
and explicit way. If they have, the court should uphold the
agreement, supporting the alternative entity underlying doctrine of
freedom to contract. However, if the provisions are ambiguous,
convoluted, or contradictory, the court should find that the
provisions do not meet the minimum standard of expressly waiving
or modifying the duties, and thus are unenforceable, with the default
fiduciary duties being in force.
Beyond what has already been discussed, this method should be
adopted by the courts for two reasons. First, fiduciary duties play an
important role in the business entity environment, and thus when
there is an ambiguity as to whether they should apply, their benefits
should support a deference to finding that they exist. Second,
because the relationship is, at its core, a fiduciary one, and it is
generally the fiduciary who wishes to waive his duties, the burden
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should be on the fiduciary to be as clear and explicit as possible when
waiving those duties.
A. The Importance of Fiduciary Duties Supports Deference in Holding
That They Apply
The importance of fulfilling one’s fiduciary duties in a fiduciary
relationship was expressed quite vividly in the famous opinion
penned by Judge Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a
tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising
rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the “disintegrating
erosion” of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden
by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment
of this court. 102

With such language as “the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive,” it is evident how important some have held fiduciary
duties to be. Surely, it is difficult to argue that Judge Cardozo would
hold such duties inapplicable when it is unclear whether an
ambiguous provision in an agreement may or may not be attempting
to waive such duties.
Fiduciary duties are owed when one exercises stewardship over
the property of another. These relationships are often formed
through contract. However, over the course of our legal history,
courts discovered that the contracts themselves were not sufficient to
protect the parties. Indeed, the court found that fiduciary duties
were needed to fill the gaps within these special types of contractual
relationships. As a result, fiduciary duties took an important role in
both the corporate and partnership worlds. However, as the desire

102.

Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted).
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for more flexible business entities emerged, so did the need for
greater contractual freedom. This contractual freedom though, as
discussed above, has now bled into the fiduciary duties context,
allowing even the duties that emerged to protect against deficiencies
in contracts to be contracted themselves and then interpreted in the
same manner as any other contractual provision.
Thus, the first reason why deference should be given to finding
that fiduciary duties apply is that contractual provisions are unable to
fulfill the same role. Simply because contractual freedom is a
compelling interest does not mean that it is also sufficient to protect
the parties involved. The problem with this contractual approach to
fiduciary duties is clear. Fiduciary duties are meant to be gap fillers
when an agreement is not explicitly applicable to a certain situation
or party. But when the provision of the agreement deals with
fiduciary duties themselves, what is left to fill in the gaps of an
ambiguous agreement? The answer for other portions of the
agreement would generally be fiduciary duties, but such a protection
is not available to fiduciary duty waivers themselves. Thus, when an
agreement is ambiguous regarding the limiting of fiduciary duties,
the court should give deference to finding that they apply, rather
than going through an elaborate exercise of finding some plausible
interpretation of the provision.
Contractualists would argue against this stance, contending that
the freedom of contract allows the parties to determine for
themselves the level and division of risk they wish to bear. Indeed,
this country’s economic history is based on the notion of freedom,
allowing parties to contract for what they will, how they will.
However, as pointed out by a leading scholar of the economics and
jurisprudence of contract law, restrictions on contracting may be
efficient when the market is inefficient, which it often is. 103 The
market can fail in at least two ways—monopolies and imperfect
information (specifically, buyer misperception of risks, buyer
misperception
of
changes
in
risks,
and
imperfect
104
seller information).

103. Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract, THE COASE LECTURE SERIES 1, 3 (CoaseSandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 33, 1995).
104. Id. at 5–18.
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Additionally, there is fallacy in treating fiduciary duty provisions
as any other contractual provisions because of the method employed
in determining if a fiduciary fulfilled his duties. In the fiduciary duty
context, the judge’s role is to determine if the fiduciary acted
appropriately within the scope of his discretion. 105 However, contract
provision interpretation is “often framed in the terms of a
hypothetical bargain,” attempting to determine the result that the
parties themselves would have chosen if they could have anticipated
the situation they currently find themselves in. 106
Second, there are also public policy reasons supporting the court
giving deference to finding that fiduciary duties apply when an
alternative entity’s agreement is ambiguous on the question.
Fiduciary duties of loyalty and care incentivize fiduciaries to act in
the best interest of the entrustor. Fiduciary duties encourage
honesty, good faith, prudence, and care in the exercise of the
fiduciary’s duties. Accordingly, ambiguity in the waiver or limiting of
such duties can reasonably be construed to incentivize the
opposite—acting in self-interested ways, and exercising fiduciary
roles with at least some negligence or lack of total care.
This is not to say that fiduciary duties should be applicable to all
business entities. There are certainly alternative entities whose
objectives would be hampered by the enforcement of fiduciary
duties. Surely it could not be argued that all waiving of fiduciary
duties is done in a self-interested motivation by the drafters. 107
However, the potential that such provisions will lead to an increase
in self-interested dealing and lack of care is no logical stretch.
Although there are surely extralegal constraints that may refrain
certain opportunistic dealing even without fiduciary duties applied, a
party’s “potential gains from such behavior often may be large
enough to swamp such incentives.” 108 Therefore, “supported by the
frequency of cases involving unfair behavior,” it would appear that
“the benefits of legally enforceable fiduciary-type duties in
supplementing extralegal incentives may seem to outweigh the

105.
106.
107.
108.

Smith & Lee, supra note 99.
Id.
See supra Part III.
Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 234.
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costs.” 109 Although full fiduciary duties may not be desirable in every
business entity, because of the incentives they create, the court
should lean towards finding fiduciary duties, rather than not. As one
has observed:
The open-ended nature of fiduciary duty reflects the law’s
longstanding recognition that devious people can smell a loophole
a mile away. For centuries, the law has assumed that (1) power
creates opportunities for abuse and (2) the devious creativity of
those in power may outstrip the prescience of those trying, through
ex ante contract drafting, to constrain that combination of power
and creativity. For an attorney to advise a client that the attorney’s
drafting skills are adequate to take the place of centuries of
fiduciary doctrine may be an example of chutzpah or hubris
(or both). 110

Given a situation where an agreement does not explicitly and
very clearly show that both parties knew and understood the duties
to be waived, the court should give deference to the finding that
fiduciary duties, which inherently incentivize fiduciaries to fulfill
their duties to their best ability, apply.
Third, due to the nature of the fiduciary relationship, these
contracts often contain complex tasks that the entrustor cannot
measure easily on his own, thus making express contracting
problematic. 111 This is especially true when one of the parties is a lay
person, as is often the case with investors in publicly traded
alternative entities. The idea of the fiduciary relationship is to have
the fiduciary do something for the entrustor that the entrustor
cannot do for herself, so it is improbable to monitor the fiduciary to
see if he is acting in an appropriate way, especially when the entrustor
has exposed herself to further liability by entering into an agreement
in which the fiduciary has waived parts of his fiduciary duties. 112
Thus, a party may not know or understand every possible situation
or nuance to contract for and being able to contract for every

109.
110.

Id.
CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES:
TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 14.05[4][a][ii] (1994).
111. Cohen, supra note 35.
112. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1212–
14 (1995).
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situation is already on its face prohibitively expensive. Add to that
the many parties that may not be able to account for a majority of
possible future situations, let alone the more complex, nuanced
situations that may arise. Shifting such a risk to the entrustor almost
seems to undermine the fiduciary relationship at its base, leading to a
mindset that the entrustor should have been able to predict what
protection she needed before she even knew what needed
protection. Thus, there are some who characterize fiduciary duties
“as a hypothetical bargain––that is, contract terms the parties
themselves would have agreed to in the absence of
transaction costs.” 113
Finally, both freedom of contract and the concept of textualism
assume that there is at least some resemblance of equal bargaining
power. However, while that may be true in some contexts, for many
others it is a fallacy—many investments, including private equity,
venture capital, real estate, and hedge funds, are done through
investment limited partnerships. 114 In many of these situations, there
is no bargaining over the content of the agreements. These are takeit-or-leave-it investments, where the fiduciary drafts, and thus
dictates, his own fiduciary duty limits. As Chancellors Strine and
Laster have observed, “[i]n approaching these entities, investors . . .
cannot rely on their understandings of default principles of law . . .
[but] must evaluate entity-specific provisions, ostensibly bargained
for on an investment-by-investment basis to protect their interests,
and then practice caveat emptor by foregoing entities whose
governing instruments are too unfavorable.” 115 The Chancellors go
on to observe that “because bargaining, at best, occurs only
sometimes, and because it is difficult to participate in certain sectors
other than through alternative entities, the practical alternatives for a
skeptical investor are often stark: invest without adequate protection
against self-dealing or avoid the asset class altogether.” 116 Therefore,
the contractualist argument that fiduciary duty waivers are products
of bargained for agreements is often not true in today’s publicly
113. Ribstein, supra note 59, at 541.
114. Jeffrey E. Horvitz, Fiduciary Duty Waivers of LPs May Expose Sponsors, PENSIONS &
INV., Oct. 14, 2013, http://www.pionline.com/article/20131014/PRINT/310149994/
fiduciary-duty-waivers-of-lps-may-expose-sponsors.
115. Strine & Laster, supra note 20, at 3.
116. Id. at 3–4.
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traded alternative entity environment. The result, thus, is fiduciaries
waiving their own fiduciary duties without any bargaining
between parties.
B. Fiduciaries Must Be Explicitly Clear in Waiving Their Duties Since,
by the Very Nature of the Relationship, They Owe Duties to
the Entrustor
The rule requiring that fiduciary duties be modified expressly
should be narrowly and strictly construed, in part because it is often
the fiduciary himself attempting to limit his duties, thus acting in a
self-interested manner, rather than for the good of the entrustor:
In varying degrees the relationships expose entrustors to
extraordinary risks. Entrustors must entrust power or property to
the fiduciaries because the fiduciaries could not perform their
services effectively otherwise, yet this exposes entrustors to the risk
that the fiduciaries will appropriate the entrusted property or
interest, or misuse the power entrusted to them. The appropriation
or abuse of power can result in a loss that far exceeds the potential
gain from the fiduciaries’ services. 117

Being placed in the role of a fiduciary, the fiduciary must make
decisions in the best interest of the entrustor. For this reason, the
courts have “note[d] the historic cautionary approach of the courts
of Delaware that efforts by a fiduciary to escape a fiduciary duty,
whether by a corporate director or officer or other type of trustee,
should be scrutinized searchingly.” 118 It is this very relationship of
trust that requires that a fiduciary waiving his duties not do so
lightly, but rather clearly and explicitly. If a fiduciary is to lower the
expectations placed on him by the law, the entrustor has a right to be
fully aware and knowledgeable regarding the level of protection she
is afforded. In a sense, when attempting to limit his fiduciary duties,
a fiduciary must not violate those same fiduciary duties. This is not
to say that he may not limit his fiduciary duties in his own interest,
for it would seem nonsensical to argue that that is not often a
primary motivating reason for such waivers, but he must do so with

117. Frankel, supra note 112, at 1212.
118. Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 168
(Del. 2002).
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no intent to harm the entrustor. In other words, the waiving of the
fiduciary duties must be fully understood by both parties, so that
both the entrustor and the fiduciary know exactly the modified
nature of their fiduciary relationship.
For such a high standard of understanding and notice to be met,
the waiving of the fiduciary duties must be as explicit and clear as
possible, as the rule implicitly demands. If there is any ambiguity or
uncertainty regarding whether fiduciary duties apply to certain
parties or actions, then the courts should find that they by default
apply, in essence placing the burden firmly on the fiduciary. Thus,
only in the most express and clear situations will a fiduciary be able
to waive his duties, leaving those entrustors who in good faith
believe they are protected to in fact be protected. This proposed
solution will not only allow for increased notice, but also will
incentivize
more
careful
drafting
of
LLC
and
partnership agreements.
C. Arguments Against not Enforcing Fiduciary Duty Waivers
There are a number of arguments against not enforcing fiduciary
duty waivers, or in other words, honoring the waivers even when
ambiguous. First, to be clear, the proposition of this Comment is not
that fiduciary duty waivers should not be honored in the alternative
entity context, but rather that when such waivers are ambiguous in
the context in which they are being asked to be enforced, that the
judiciary strictly and narrowly construe the rule that the waivers
must be express—requiring all waivers and modifying provisions be
explicit, clear, and unambiguous. If the relevant provisions do not
meet this standard, then the court should find that the default
fiduciary duties apply.
One argument against not upholding fiduciary duty waivers is
that the ex-post harm to the beneficiary by the fiduciary is the same
as enforcing any other contract even though one party may feel
regret because in the end the contract favored one party over the
other. 119 The fundamental problem with this argument is the treating
of fiduciary duties like any other contractual element or duty.
Fiduciary duties are more than that. Fiduciary duties exist beyond

119.

Ribstein, supra note 59, at 551.
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the contract and stem from the relationship itself. Indeed, the nature
of fiduciary duties is to fill in the gaps of the contract that creates the
fiduciary relationship. Thus, comparing the waiving of fiduciary
duties to any other contractual provision, such as an agreement on
consideration, is overly simplistic and misses the point of the
duties themselves.
Addressing the interpretation issue, some argue that “courts can
deal with this sort of question, as they have with other interpretation
issues, on a case-by-case basis.” 120 As discussed in detail above, such a
cavalier approach to ad hoc decision making is not appropriate in the
fiduciary duty context. Additionally, the interpretative methods of
fiduciary duties of a necessity require a variation from those of
traditional contractual provisions. Although the importance of
freedom of contract cannot be disputed, neither can the importance
of parties being able to have their expectations realized in the
context of their fiduciary duties and rights.
In the end, a great deal of the arguments against not enforcing
fiduciary duty waivers are based on the principle of freedom of
contract. Freedom of contract is a primary reason that a number of
entities organize themselves as LLCs and LLPs in Delaware, and
thus freedom of contract cannot just be swept aside. However, by
entering into one of these alternative entities, the parties have
manifested a desire to be part of a fiduciary relationship, with all of
the fiduciary duties that come with such a relationship. This
Comment does not propose that fiduciary duties trump the freedom
of contract, only that fiduciary duties are of such importance in the
business world that, if parties are to utilize the freedom of contract
in the drafting of alternative entity agreements, they must do so with
heightened precision and clarity so as to ensure that all parties
involved are fully aware of the fiduciary duties they owe and
are owed.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the popularity and wide acceptance of alternative entities has
increased, issues surrounding the contractual freedom inherent in
them have surfaced. In particular, courts have been faced with the

120.
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difficult task of interpreting fiduciary duty waivers in LLC and
partnership agreements. Because of the fundamental role that
fiduciary duties have played in the business law context, as well as the
important benefits that continue to be realized from their
recognition, attempts to waive fiduciary duties should be scrutinized
by the courts. Although the Delaware legislature clearly allows for
the waiver or modification of these duties, the current rule requires
that such waivers or modifications be done expressly. The courts
should narrowly and strictly construe this rule. Unless a provision is
explicitly clear regarding which fiduciary duties do and do not apply,
and to whom they apply, the courts should find that default
traditional duties of loyalty and care are in force. Thus, whenever
there is material ambiguity regarding fiduciary duty provisions, the
courts should first determine if the standard of clear and explicit
modification has been met, and if not, end the interpretation there,
finding that the default duties apply. This proposed solution will
promote more careful agreement drafting, decreased litigation costs
over ambiguous provisions, increased predictability to all parties
involved, and increased protection for those who believe they
are protected.
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